# 1NC

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#### **The 1AC is a fetish of so-called ‘successful’ movements of the past. Their attempt at academic change sustains the power’s ability to constrain dissent and suppress the victims of power into a ghostly remnant. The proposition that a ballot in this debate round can actually change anything ignores the coordinates of power and knowledge at play in academia – the only thing they do is feed more ammo to the machine**

Occupied UC Berkeley 09, 11/19/09, (“The Necrosocial: Civic Life, Social Death, and the UC”, <http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/the-necrosocial/>, AW)

--- We don’t endorse the language in this card ---

Yes, very much a cemetery. Only here there are no dirges, no prayers, only the repeated testing of our threshold for anxiety, humiliation, and debt. The classroom just like the workplace just like the university just like the state just like the economy manages our social death, translating what we once knew from high school, from work, from our family life into academic parlance, into acceptable forms of social conflict.

Who knew that behind so much civic life (electoral campaigns, student body representatives, bureaucratic administrators, public relations officials, Peace and Conflict Studies, ad nauseam) was so much social death? What postures we maintain to claim representation, what limits we assume, what desires we dismiss?

And in this moment of crisis they ask us to twist ourselves in a way that they can hear. Petitions to Sacramento, phone calls to Congressmen—even the chancellor patronizingly congratulates our September 24th student strike, shaping the meaning and the force of the movement as a movement against the policies of Sacramento. He expands his institutional authority to encompass the movement. When students begin to hold libraries over night, beginning to take our first baby step as an autonomous movement he reins us in by serendipitously announcing library money. He manages movement, he kills movement by funneling it into the electoral process. He manages our social death. He looks forward to these battles on his terrain, to eulogize a proposition, to win this or that—he and his look forward to exhausting us.

He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where ideas are wisps of ether—that is, meaning is ripped from action. Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only in their managed form: to perpetually deliberate, the endless fleshing-out-of—when we push the boundaries of this form they are quick to reconfigure themselves to contain us: the chancellor’s congratulations, the reopening of the libraries, the managed general assembly—there is no fight against the administration here, only its own extension.

Each day passes in this way, the administration on the look out to shape student discourse—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. It becomes banal, thoughtless. So much so that we see we are accumulating days: one semester, two, how close to being this or that, how far? This accumulation is our shared history. This accumulation—every once in a while interrupted, violated by a riot, a wild protest, unforgettable fucking, the overwhelming joy of love, life shattering heartbreak—is a muted, but desirous life. A dead but restless and desirous life.

The university steals and homogenizes our time yes, our bank accounts also, but it also steals and homogenizes meaning. As much as capital is invested in building a killing apparatus abroad, an incarceration apparatus in California, it is equally invested here in an apparatus for managing social death. Social death is, of course, simply the power source, the generator, of civic life with its talk of reform, responsibility, unity. A ‘life,’ then, which serves merely as the public relations mechanism for death: its garrulous slogans of freedom and democracy designed to obscure the shit and decay in which our feet are planted. Yes, the university is a graveyard, but it is also a factory: a factory of meaning which produces civic life and at the same time produces social death. A factory which produces the illusion that meaning and reality can be separated; which everywhere reproduces the empty reactionary behavior of students based on the values of life (identity), liberty (electoral politics), and happiness (private property). Everywhere the same whimsical ideas of the future. Everywhere democracy. Everywhere discourse to shape our desires and distress in a way acceptable to the electoral state, discourse designed to make our very moments here together into a set of legible and fruitless demands.

Totally managed death. A machine for administering death, for the proliferation of technologies of death. As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, it matters little what face one puts on the university—whether Yudof or some other lackey. These are merely the personifications of the rule of the dead, the pools of investments, the buildings, the flows of materials into and out of the physical space of the university—each one the product of some exploitation—which seek to absorb more of our work, more tuition, more energy. The university is a machine which wants to grow, to accumulate, to expand, to absorb more and more of the living into its peculiar and perverse machinery: high-tech research centers, new stadiums and office complexes. And at this critical juncture the only way it can continue to grow is by more intense exploitation, higher tuition, austerity measures for the departments that fail to pass the test of ‘relevancy.’

But the ‘irrelevant’ departments also have their place. With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, they perpetuate the blind inertia of meaning ostensibly detached from its social context. As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, these discourses and research programs play their own role, co-opting and containing radical potential. And so we attend lecture after lecture about how ‘discourse’ produces ‘subjects,’ ignoring the most obvious fact that we ourselves are produced by this discourse about discourse which leaves us believing that it is only words which matter, words about words which matter. The university gladly permits the precautionary lectures on biopower; on the production of race and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities. A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us against any confrontational radicalism. And all the while power weaves the invisible nets which contain and neutralize all thought and action, that bind revolution inside books, lecture halls.

There is no need to speak truth to power when power already speaks the truth. The university is a graveyard– así es. The graveyard of liberal good intentions, of meritocracy, opportunity, equality, democracy. Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to the university’s ghosts, the ghosts of all those it has excluded—the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. They are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs, given their book titles, their citations. This is our gothic—we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless.

In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within prescribed identity categories—our force will be dependent on the limited spaces of recognition built between us. Here we are at odds with one another socially, each of us: students, faculty, staff, homebums, activists, police, chancellors, administrators, bureaucrats, investors, politicians, faculty/ staff/ homebums/ activists/ police/ chancellors/ administrators/ bureaucrats/ investors/ politicians-to-be. That is, we are students, or students of color, or queer students of color, or faculty, or Philosophy Faculty, or Gender and Women Studies faculty, or we are custodians, or we are shift leaders—each with our own office, place, time, and given meaning. We form teams, clubs, fraternities, majors, departments, schools, unions, ideologies, identities, and subcultures—and thankfully each group gets its own designated burial plot. Who doesn’t participate in this graveyard?

In the university we prostrate ourselves before a value of separation, which in reality translates to a value of domination. We spend money and energy trying to convince ourselves we’re brighter than everyone else. Somehow, we think, we possess some trait that means we deserve more than everyone else. We have measured ourselves and we have measured others. It should never feel terrible ordering others around, right? It should never feel terrible to diagnose people as an expert, manage them as a bureaucrat, test them as a professor, extract value from their capital as a businessman. It should feel good, gratifying, completing. It is our private wet dream for the future; everywhere, in everyone this same dream of domination. After all, we are intelligent, studious, young. We worked hard to be here, we deserve this.

We are convinced, owned, broken. We know their values better than they do: life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. This triumvirate of sacred values are ours of course, and in this moment of practiced theater—the fight between the university and its own students—we have used their words on their stages: Save public education!

When those values are violated by the very institutions which are created to protect them, the veneer fades, the tired set collapses: and we call it injustice, we get indignant. We demand justice from them, for them to adhere to their values. What many have learned again and again is that these institutions don’t care for those values, not at all, not for all. And we are only beginning to understand that those values are not even our own.

The values create popular images and ideals (healthcare, democracy, equality, happiness, individuality, pulling yourself up by your bootstraps, public education) while they mean in practice the selling of commodified identities, the state’s monopoly on violence, the expansion of markets and capital accumulation, the rule of property, the rule of exclusions based on race, gender, class, and domination and humiliation in general. They sell the practice through the image. We’re taught we’ll live the images once we accept the practice.

In this crisis the Chancellors and Presidents, the Regents and the British Petroleums, the politicians and the managers, they all intend to be true to their values and capitalize on the university economically and socially—which is to say, nothing has changed, it is only an escalation, a provocation. Their most recent attempt to reorganize wealth and capital is called a crisis so that we are more willing to accept their new terms as well as what was always dead in the university, to see just how dead we are willing to play, how non-existent, how compliant, how desirous.

#### Their “try or die” framing re-inscribes the status quo’s limited scope of politics by maintaining the duality of forced choices as EITHER the aff OR the status quo – Refuse the choices as offered, demand a third option ­– embrace an imperceptible politics of the present

Stephenson et al 8, Dimitris Papadopoulos, PhD in Social Sciences from the Free University of Berlin, Niamh Stephenson, Senior Lecturer in Social Science the School of Public Health and Community Medicine, Vassils Tsianos, PhD Sociology Department of Social Sciences from the University of Hamburg, 2008, (“Escape Routes Control and Subversion in the Twenty-first Century”, <http://www.elimeyerhoff.com/books/Escape_routes.pdf>, AW)

Imperceptible politics is driven by imagination and fictionality – the imagination required to address an absence, as Santos (2003) describes it. As discussed above, representation diminishes the senses. Not only does representation dictate the terms of inclusion in political disputes of a certain field, it blunts our capacities even to perceive the multiple realities of bodies, people, desires – inappropriate/d forms of life (Trinh T. Minh-ha, 1987). These inappropriate/d modes of existence, this excess of social relations, remain after the existing regime of control has dissected and transformed subjectivities into controllable objects of discourse: bodies become identities, people become demos, desires become demands. Imperceptible politics starts from this excess of inappropriate/d modes of existence which from the perspective of the regime of control constitutes a void (Badiou, 2005a), a void residing in the political system of representation. As Badiou (2001, p. 68) says about the void, it is the very heart of a particular situation around which ‘the plenitude’ of social and material relations making up this specific situation is organised. This plenitude is mirrored, managed and regulated through procedures of representation (it is policed, as we said with Rancière in the previous chapter). Consider, for example, the surveillance and control of highly patrolled passages of migrational flows through the porous borders of Global North Atlantic countries. There is a plenitude of laws, practices, institutions, customs, migration police and border patrols, rituals, detention centres, informal migrant networks, knowledges, life projects and much more, which makes up this situation. This abundance is structured around an absence: the embodied and unrep- resentable desire which people follow as they cross borders despite the regime of control which tries to close them off or to constrain and control them. When they enter into the language of the plenitude, these people are called illegal migrants. They are treated as a problem, an economic, social or humanitarian problem, which has to be solved through deportation, revisiting legislation or negotiations with other states. What is absent is their actual movement, what people become as they navigate the fissures of nation states and borders. The absences of the inappropriate/d migrants and their desire constitute a void, a void around which this situation is organised. When all these inappropriate/d modes of existence beyond identity and passports become represented, it is only to be measured, policed, and finally, controlled. But they do not always become represented: when the void becomes an action, it does so as a force which challenges the existing organisation of plenitude in a certain field. Because it cannot be accommodated in the current situation within existing conditions of control, it is a constituent force pushing for a radical change. The imperceptible politics emanating from the void cannot be ignored. The millions of inappropriate/d bodies render borders permeable de facto, throw the current regime of control into disarray, force sovereignty to reassemble itself – everyday imperceptible politics becomes escape from a regime of control. Imperceptible politics is the moment when the void of mobility (or labour or life, as we show in the next sections) becomes subversive. Some may want to use the word resistance instead. But here we understand subversion (or resistance if you prefer) in a positive way: as the desire to depart from the plenitude which organises control in a certain field. Or better, as the trust in something which is absent and unrepresentable, and yet operative and constitutive of a specific field. This desire comes from the very heart of the situation, but leads directly and unconditionally beyond it. Desire. Trust. Escape! This is the only understanding of resistance which is relevant for imperceptible politics, and it is indeed the only understanding of resistance which escapes the melancholic uptake of Foucault’s work in neoliberal times. This is the reason why we prefer to talk of subversion instead of resistance in this book. Drawing on Johannes Agnoli’s (1996) intriguing exploration of the historical metamorphoses of this concept, we understand subversion as the process of reclaiming a form of praxis which is there but is forgotten, suppressed and rendered seemingly absent. It is an act which cannot be understood as critique, or as a form of dialectical negation of negation, or even resistance but it stands there as ‘negation sans phrase’ (Agnoli, 1996, p. 16), that is conceptual and theoretical work which obtains its efficacy only through ‘laborious mole-work’ (Agnoli, 1996, p. 226). Subversion is that which is banished and eradicated through political representation, yet never completely. As an act of reclaiming, the subversion entailed in imperceptible politics is located in the everyday and precedes and prepares the practice of escape itself. Subversion remains imperceptible to the representational policing of a field and works with an excess of social relations which spring from the ‘absent centre’ of this particular field. This is the fictional and imaginary character of imperceptible politics. It is only by conjuring up the speculative and fictional qualities (see previous chapter and Haraway, 1992, 2004) of a situation that it is possible to address something which is absent and yet there, something arising from the core of the situation but which is yet to emerge. Imperceptible politics is here, always present within a regime of control, cultivating trust in speculative figurations of a radically different future in the present. Imperceptible politics is here.

## Case

#### The 1AC identifies the status quo’s gendered architecture in a man woman dichotomy – this is not neutral – but what we think is a deliberate and coercive stance

1AC Method Author (Federici 12), (<http://wealthofthecommons.org/essay/feminism-and-politics-commons>, AW)

It remains to be clarified that assigning women this task of commoning/collectivizing reproduction is not to concede to a naturalistic conception of femininity. Understandably, many feminists view this possibility as a fate worse than death. It is deeply sculpted in our collective consciousness that women have been designated as men’s common, a natural source of wealth and services to be as freely appropriated by them as the capitalists have appropriated the wealth of nature. But to paraphrase Dolores Hayden, the reorganization of reproductive work, and therefore the reorganization of housing and public space, is not a question of identity; it is a question of labor and, we can add, a question of power and safety (Hayden 1986). I am reminded here of the experience of the women members of the Landless People’s Movement of Brazil [the MST] who, after their communities won the right to maintain the land that they had occupied, insisted that the new houses be built to form one compound so that they could continue to communalize their housework, wash together, cook together, as they had done in the course of the struggle, and be ready to run to give each other support when abused by men. Arguing that women should take the lead in the collectivization of reproductive work and housing is not to naturalize housework as a female vocation. It is refusing to obliterate the collective experiences, the knowledge and the struggles that women have accumulated concerning reproductive work, whose history has been an essential part of our resistance to capitalism. Reconnecting with this history is a crucial step for women and men today both to undo the gendered architecture of our lives and to reconstruct our homes and lives as commons.

#### WE CALL B.S.

#### Counter-methodology: Nate and I advocate an adoption of the commons with Mexico starting from a queer perspective of a reproductive economy.

#### Idealizing exclusionary gender norms link turns the emancipatory potential of feminism – reifies hierarchal dominance

Butler 99 (Judith, 1999 Gender Trouble: Feminism and the subversion of Identity, Kindle Version) sjb p.vii-viii\

In 1989 I was most concerned to criticize a pervasive heterosexual assumption in feminist literary theory. I sought to counter those views that made presumptions about the limits and propriety of gender and restricted the meaning of gender to received notions of masculinity and femininity. It was and remains my view that **any feminist theory that restricts the meaning of gender** in the presuppositions of its own practice **sets up exclusionary gender norms within feminism**, **often with homophobic consequences.** It seemed to me, and continues to seem, that **feminism ought to be careful not to idealize certain expressions of gender that,** in turn, **produce** new forms of hierarchy and exclusion. In particular, I opposed those regimes of truth that stipulated that certain kinds of gendered expressions were found to be false or derivative, and others, true and original. **The point was not to prescribe a new gendered way of life** that might then serve as a model for readers of the text. Rather, the aim of the text was to open up the field of possibility for gender without dictating which kinds of possibilities ought to be realized. One might wonder what use “opening up possibilities” finally is, but no one who has understood what it is to live in the social world as what is “impossible,” illegible, unrealizable, unreal, and illegitimate is likely to pose that question.

#### Anti-queerness is the condition of possibility for all other forms of oppression

Yep 03, Gust A, Prof of Sexuality Studies @ San Francisco State, The Violence of Heteronormativity in Communication Studies: Notes on Injury, Healing, and Queer World-Making,

In this passage, Simmons vividly describes the devastating pervasiveness of hatred and violence in her daily life based on being seen, perceived, labeled, and treated as an “Other.” This process of othering creates individuals, groups, and communities that are deemed to be less important, less worthwhile, less consequential, less authorized, and less human based on historically situated markers of social formation such as race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, and nationality. Othering and marginalization are results of an “invisible center” (Ferguson, 1990, p. 3). The authority, position, and power of such a center are attained through normalization in an ongoing circular movement. Normalization is the process of constructing, establishing, producing, and reproducing a taken-for-granted and all-encompassing standard used to measure goodness, desirability, morality, rationality, superiority, and a host of other dominant cultural values. As such, normalization becomes one of the primary instruments of power in modern society (Foucault, 1978/1990). Normalization is a symbolically, discursively, psychically, psychologically, and materially violent form of social regulation and control, or as Warner (1993) more simply puts it, normalization is “the site of violence” (p. xxvi). Perhaps one of the most powerful forms of normalization in Western social systems is heteronormativity. Through heteronormative discourses, abject and abominable bodies, souls, persons, and life forms are created, examined, and disciplined through current regimes of knowledge and power (Foucault, 1978/1990). Heteronormativity, as the invisible center and the presumed bedrock of society, is the quintessential force creating, sustaining, and perpetuating the erasure, marginalization, disempowerment, and oppression of sexual others.

#### Case Proper:

#### While gender has a large impact – it isn’t monolithic, nor unified

Hooper 1 Charlotte (University of Bristol research associate in politics), Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics pp 45-46.

Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan (1993), in their discussion of gendered dichotomies, appear to drop Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse as an explanation for gendered dichotomies in favor of a more straightforward- ly political account.14Gendered dichotomies, rather than uniformly con- structing gendered social relations through universal psychoanalytic mecha- nisms, are seen more ambiguously, as playing a dual role. Where gendered dichotomies are used as an organizing principle of social life (such as in the gendered division of labor) they help to construct gender differences and in- equalities and thus are constitutive of social reality, but in positing a grid of polar opposites, they also serve to obscure more complex relationships, commonalties, overlaps, and intermediate positions (Peterson and Runyan 1993, 24–25). Elaborating on this view, it can be argued that gendered dichotomies are in part ideological tools that mystify, masking more complex social realities and reinforcing stereotypes. On one level, they do help to produce real gen- der differences and inequalities, when they are used as organizing principles that have practical effects commensurate with the extent that they become embedded in institutional practices, and through these, human bodies. They constitute one dimension in the triangular nexus out of which gender identities and the gender order are produced. But at the same time, institutional practices are not always completely or unambiguously informed by such dichotomies, which may then **operate to obscure more complex relationships**. It is a mistake to see the language of gendered dichotomies as a uniﬁed and totalizing discourse that dictates every aspect of social practice to the extent that we are coherently produced as subjects in its dualistic image. As well as the disruptions and discontinuities engendered by the intersections and interjections of other discourses (race, class, sexuality, and so on) **there is always room for evasion, reversal, resistance, and dissonance** between rhetoric, practice, and embodiment, as well as reproduction of the symbolic order, as identities are negotiated in relation to all three dimensions, in a variety of **complex and changing circumstances**. On the other hand, the symbolic gender order does inform practice, and our subjectivities are produced in relation to it, so to dismiss it as performing only an ideological or propagandistic role is also too simplistic.

#### Proves that the aff denies complex and interpersonal relationships – they can’t solve anything

Crenshaw, PhD, 2

Carrie, PhD, Perspectives In Controversy: Selected Articles from CAD, Scholar

 Feminism is not dead. It is alive and well in intercollegiate debate. **Increasingly, students rely on feminist authors** to inform their analysis of resolutions. While I applaud these initial efforts to explore feminist thought, I am concerned that **such arguments** only **exemplify the general absence of sound causal reasoning** in debate rounds. Poor causal reasoning results from a debate practice that privileges empirical proof over rhetorical proof, fostering ignorance of the subject matter being debated. To illustrate my point, I claim that **debate arguments about feminists suffer from a reductionism that tends to marginalize** the **voices** of significant feminist authors. David Zarefsky made a persuasive case for the value of causal reasoning in intercollegiate debate as far back as 1979. He argued that **causal arguments are desirable for four reasons. First, causal analysis increases the control of the arguer over events by promoting understanding** of them. **Second**, the **use of causal reasoning increases rigor of analysis** and fairness in the decision-making process. **Third, causal arguments promote understanding of the philosophical paradox that presumably good people tolerate the existence of evil**. Finally, **causal reasoning supplies good reasons for "commitments to policy choices or to systems of belief which transcend whim, caprice, or the non-reflexive "claims of immediacy**" (117-9). Rhetorical proof plays an important role in the analysis of causal relationships. This is true despite the common assumption that the identification of cause and effect relies solely upon empirical investigation. For Zarefsky, there are three types of causal reasoning. The first type of causal reasoning describes the application of a covering law to account for physical or material conditions that cause a resulting event This type of causal reasoning requires empirical proof prominent in scientific investigation. A second type of causal reasoning requires the assignment of responsibility. Responsible human beings as agents cause certain events to happen; that is, causation resides in human beings (107-08). A third type of causal claim explains the existence of a causal relationship. It functions "to provide reasons to justify a belief that a causal connection exists" (108). The second and third types of causal arguments rely on rhetorical proof, the provision of "good reasons" to substantiate arguments about human responsibility or explanations for the existence of a causal relationship (108). I contend that the practice of intercollegiate debate privileges the first type of causal analysis. It reduces questions of human motivation and explanation to a level of empiricism appropriate only for causal questions concerning physical or material conditions. Arguments about feminism clearly illustrate this phenomenon. Substantive debates about feminism usually take one of two forms. First, on the affirmative, debaters argue that some aspect of the resolution is a manifestation of patriarchy. For example, given the spring 1992 resolution, "[rjesolved: That advertising degrades the quality of life," many affirmatives argued that the portrayal of women as beautiful objects for men's consumption is a manifestation of patriarchy that results in tangible harms to women such as rising rates of eating disorders. The fall 1992 topic, "(rjesolved: That the welfare system exacerbates the problems of the urban poor in the United States," also had its share of patri- archy cases. Affirmatives typically argued that women's dependence upon a patriarchal welfare system results in increasing rates of women's poverty. In addition to these concrete harms to individual women, most affirmatives on both topics, desiring "big impacts," argued that the effects of patriarchy include nightmarish totalitarianism and/or nuclear annihilation. On the negative, many debaters countered with arguments that the some aspect of the resolution in some way sustains or energizes the feminist movement in resistance to patriarchal harms. For example, some negatives argued that sexist advertising provides an impetus for the reinvigoration of the feminist movement and/or feminist consciousness, ultimately solving the threat of patriarchal nuclear annihilation. likewise, debaters negating the welfare topic argued that the state of the welfare system is the key issue around which the feminist movement is mobilizing or that the consequence of the welfare system - breakup of the patriarchal nuclear family -undermines patriarchy as a whole. **Such arguments seem to have two assumptions in common. First, there is a single feminism**. As a result, feminists are transformed into feminism. Debaters speak of feminism as **a single, monolithic, theoretical and pragmatic entity** and feminists as women with identical m otivations, methods, and goals. Second, **these arguments assume that patriarchy is the single or root cause of all forms of oppression**. Patriarchy not only is responsible for sexism and the consequent oppression of women, it also is the cause of totalitarianism, environmental degradation, nuclear war, racism, and capitalist exploitation. **These** reductionist arguments **reflect an** unwillingness to debateabout the **complexities of human motivation and explanation**. They betray a reliance upon a framework of proof that can explain only material conditions and physical realities through empirical quantification. The transformation of feminists to feminism and the identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of all oppression is related in part to the current form of intercollegiate debate practice. By "form," I refer to Kenneth Burke's notion of form, defined as the "creation of appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite" (Counter-Statement 31). Though the framework for this understanding of form is found in literary and artistic criticism, it is appropriate in this context; as Burke notes, literature can be "equipment for living" (Biilosophy 293). He also suggests that form "is an arousing and fulfillment of desires. A work has form in so far as one part of it leads a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by the sequence" (Counter-Statement 124). Burke observes that there are several aspects to the concept of form. One of these aspects, conventional form, involves to some degree the appeal of form as form. Progressive, repetitive, and minor forms, may be effective even though the reader has no awareness of their formality. But when a form appeals as form, we designate it as conventional form. Any form can become conventional, and be sought for itself - whether it be as complex as the Greek tragedy or as compact as the sonnet (Counter-Statement 126). These concepts help to explain debaters' continuing reluctance to employ rhetorical proof in arguments about causality. **Debaters practice the convention of poor causal** reasoning as a result of judges' unexamined reliance upon conventional form. Convention is the practice of arguing single-cause links to monolithic impacts that arises out of custom or usage. Conventional form is the expectation of judges that an argument will take this form. Common practice or convention dictates that a case or disadvantage with nefarious impacts causally related to a single link will "outweigh" opposing claims in the mind of the judge. In this sense, debate arguments themselves are conventional. **Debaters practice the convention of establishing single-cause relationships to large monolithic impacts** in order to conform to audience expectation. Debaters practice poor causal reasoning because they are rewarded for it by judges. The convention of arguing single-cause links leads the judge to anticipate the certainty of the impact and to be gratified by the sequence. I suspect that the sequence is gratifying for judges because it relieves us from the responsibility and difficulties of evaluating rhetorical proofs. We are caught between our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proofs and our reluctance to succumb to complete relativism and subjectivity. To take responsibility for evaluating rhetorical proof is to admit that not every question has an empirical answer. However, **when we abandon our responsibility to rhetorical proofs, we sacrifice our students'** understanding of causal reasoning**. The sacrifice has consequences for our students' knowledge of the subject matter they are debating.** For example, when feminism is defined as a single entity, not as a pluralized movement or theory, that single entity results in the **identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression**. The result **is ignorance of the subject position of the particular feminist author,** for highlighting his or her subject position might draw attention to the incompleteness of the causal relationship between link and impact **Consequently, debaters do not challenge the basic assumptions of such argumentation and ignorance of feminists is perpetuated**. Feminists are not feminism. The topics of feminist inquiry are many and varied, as are the philosophical approaches to the study of these topics. Different authors have attempted categorization of various feminists in distinctive ways. For example, Alison Jaggar argues that feminists can be divided into four categories: liberal feminism, marxist feminism, radical feminism, and socialist feminism. While each of these feminists may share a common commitment to the improvement of women's situations, they differ from each other in very important ways and reflect divergent philosophical assumptions that make them each unique. Linda Alcoff presents an entirely different categorization of feminist theory based upon distinct understandings of the concept "woman," including cultural feminism and post-structural feminism. Karen Offen utilizes a comparative historical approach to examine two distinct modes of historical argumentation or discourse that have been used by women and their male allies on behalf of women's emancipation from male control in Western societies. These include relational feminism and individualist feminism. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron describe a whole category of French feminists that contain many distinct versions of the feminist project by French authors. Women of color and third-world feminists have argued that even these broad categorizations of the various feminism have neglected the contributions of non-white, non-Western feminists (see, for example, hooks; Hull; Joseph and Lewis; Lorde; Moraga; Omolade; and Smith). In this literature, the very definition of feminism is contested. Some feminists argue that "all feminists are united by a commitment to improving the situation of women" (Jaggar and Rothenberg xii), while others have resisted the notion of a single definition of feminism, bell hooks observes, "a central problem within feminist discourse has been our inability to either arrive at a consensus of opinion about what feminism is (or accept definitions) that could serve as points of unification" (Feminist Theory 17). **The controversy over the very definition of feminism has political implications. The power to define is the power both to include and exclude people and ideas in and from that feminism**. As a result, [bjourgeois white women interested in women's rights issues have been satisfied with simple definitions for obvious reasons. Rhetorically placing themselves in the same social category as oppressed women, they were not anxious to call attention to race and class privilege (hooks. Feminist Wieory 18). Debate arguments that assume a singular conception of feminism include and empower the voices of race- and class-privileged women while excluding and silencing the voices of feminists marginalized by race and class status. This position becomes clearer **when we examine** the second assumption of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate - **patriarchy is the sole cause** of oppression. **Important feminist thought has resisted this assumption for good reason. Designating patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression allows the** subjugation of resistance to other forms of oppression **like racism and classism to the struggle against sexism. Such subjugation has the effect of denigrating the legitimacy of resistance to racism and classism as struggles of equal importance**. "Within feminist movement in the West, **this led to the assumption that resisting patriarchal domination is a more legitimate feminist action than resisting racism and other forms of domination**" (hooks. Talking Back 19). The relegation of struggles against racism and class exploitation to offspring status is not the only implication of the "sole cause" argument In addition, **identifying patriarchy as the single source of oppression obscures women's perpetration of other forms of subjugation and domination**, bell hooks argues that we should not obscure the reality that women can and do partici- pate in politics of domination, as perpetrators as well as victims - that we dominate, that we are dominated. **If focus on patriarchal domination masks this reality** or becomes the means by which women deflect attention from the real conditions and circumstances of our lives, **then women cooperate in suppressing and promoting false consciousness, inhibiting our capacity to assume responsibility for transforming ourselves and society** (hooks. Talking Back 20). **Characterizing patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression allows mainstream feminists to abdicate responsibility for the exercise of class and race privilege**. It casts the struggle against class exploitation and racism as secondary concerns. Current debate practice promotes ignorance of these issues because debaters appeal to conventional form, the expectation of judges that they will isolate a single link to a large impact Feminists become feminism and patriarchy becomes the sole cause of all evil. Poor causal arguments arouse and fulfill the expectation of judges by allowing us to surrender our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proof for complex causal relationships. **The result is either the mar-ginalization or colonization of certain feminist voices**. Arguing feminism in debate rounds risks trivializing feminists. **Privileging the act of speaking about feminism over the content of speech "often turns the voices and beings of non-white women into commodity, spectacle**" (hooks, Talking Back 14). **Teaching sophisticated causal reasoning enables our students to learn more concerning the subject matter about which they argue. In this case, students would learn more about the multiplicity of feminists instead of reproducing the marginalization of many feminist voices in the debate itself**. The content of the speech of feminists must be investigated to subvert the colonization of exploited women. To do so, we must explore alternatives to the formal expectation of single-cause links to enormous impacts for appropriation of the marginal voice threatens the very core of self-determination and free self-expression for exploited and oppressed peoples. If the identified audience, those spoken to, is determined solely by ruling groups who control production and distribution, then it is easy for the marginal voice striving for a hearing to allow what is said to be overdetermined by the needs of that majority group who appears to be listening, to be tuned in (hooks, Talking Back 14). At this point, arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate seem to be overdetermined by the expectation of common practice, the "game" that we play in assuming there is such a thing as a direct and sole causal link to a monolithic impact To play that game, we have gone along with the idea that there is a single feminism and the idea that patriarchal impacts can account for all oppression. In making this critique, I am by no means discounting the importance of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate. In fact, feminists contain the possibility of a transformational politic for two reasons. First, feminist concerns affect each individual intimately. We are most likely to encounter patriarchal domination "in an ongoing way in everyday life. Unlike other forms of domination, sexism directly shapes and determines relations of power in our private lives, in familiar social spaces..." (hooks. Talking Back 21). Second, the methodology of feminism, consciousness-raising, contains within it the possibility of real societal transformation. "lE]ducation for critical consciousness can be extended to include politicization of the self that focuses on creating understanding the ways sex, race, and class together determine our individual lot and our collective experience" (hooks, Talking Back 24). Observing the incongruity between advocacy of single-cause relationships and feminism does not discount the importance of feminists to individual or societal consciousness raising.

The affirmative is a double turn – the idea of a womanist struggle against capitalism is counter-productive. Anti capitalist movements have no room for identity politics they are tailored at reform whilst anticap movements are tailored to revolution against the entire state

Herod 7 (James, Columbia U graduate and political activist, “Getting Free” Pg. 33 JF)

The so-called new social movements, based on gender, racial, sexual, or ethnic identities, cannot destroy capitalism. In general, they haven’t even tried. Except for a tiny fringe of radicals in each of them, they have been attempting to get into the system, not overthrow it. This is true for women, blacks, homosexuals, and ethnic (including Anative) groups, as well as many other identities old people, people with disabilities, mothers on welfare, and so forth. Nothing has derailed the anticapitalist struggle during the past quarter century so thoroughly as have these movements. Sometimes it seems that identity politics is all that remains of the left. Identity politics has simply swamped class politics. The mainstream versions of these movements (the ones fighting to get into the system rather than overthrow it) have given capitalists a chance to do a little fine-tuning by eliminating tensions here and there, and by including token representatives of the excluded groups. Many of the demands of these movements can be easily accommodated. Capitalists can live with boards of directors exhibiting ethnic, gender, and racial diversity as long as all the board members are procapitalist. Capitalists can easily accept a rainbow cabinet as long as the cabinet is pushing the corporate agenda. So mainstream identity politics has not threatened capitalism at all. The radical wings of the new social movements, however, are rather more subversive. These militants realized that it was necessary to attack the whole social order in order to uproot racism and sexism problems that could not be overcome under capitalism since they are an integral part of it. There is no denying the evils of racism, sexism, and nationalism, which are major structural supports to ruling-class control. These militants have done whatever they could to highlight, analyze, and ameliorate these evils. Unfortunately, for the most part, their voices have been lost in all the clamor for admittance to the system by the majorities in their own movements.

#### The aff’s claim to emancipation collapses the real material difference between our position as debaters and oppressed individuals for whom resistance is not a simple language-game---their deployment of an unproblematic posture of victimization spotlights the aff’s righteousness while robbing the oppressed of protest

Chow 93—Anne Firor Scott Professor of Literature at Trinity College of Arts and Sciences, Duke University (Rey, Writing Diaspora, 11-5)

Until the very end of the novel, Jane is always excluded from every available form of social power. Her survival seems to depend on renouncing what power might come to her as teacher, mistress, cousin, heiress, or missionary's wife. She repeatedly flees from such forms of inclusion in the field of power, as if her status as an exemplary subject, like her authority as narrator, depends entirely on her claim to a kind of truth which can only be made from a position of powerlessness. By creating such an unlovely heroine and subjecting her to one form of harassment after another, Brontë demonstrates the power of words alone. 18¶ This reading of Jane Eyre highlights her not simply as the female underdog who is often identified by feminist and Marxist critics, but as the intellectual who acquires power through a moral rectitude that was to become the flip side of Western imperialism's ruthlessness. Lying at the core of Anglo­American liberalism, this moral rectitude would accompany many territorial and economic conquests overseas with a firm sense of social mission. When Jane Eyre went to the colonies in the nineteenth century, she turned into the Christian missionary. It is this understanding—that Brontë's depiction of a socially marginalized English woman is, in terms of ideological production, fully complicit with England's empire­building ambition rather than opposed to it—that prompted Gayatri Spivak to read Jane Eyre as a text in the service of imperialism. Referring to Brontë's treatment of the "madwoman" Bertha Mason, the white Jamaican Creole character, Spivak charges Jane Eyre for, precisely, its humanism, in which the "native subject" is not created as an animal but as "the object of what might be termed the terrorism of¶ 12¶ the categorical imperative." This kind of creation is imperialism's use/travesty of the Kantian metaphysical demand to "make the heathen into a human so that he can be treated as an end in himself." 19 In the twentieth century, as Europe's former colonies became independent, Jane Eyre became the Maoist. Michel de Certeau describes the affinity between her two major reincarnations, one religious and the other political, this way:¶ The place that was formerly occupied by the Church or Churches vis­à­vis the established powers remains recognizable, over the past two centuries, in the functioning of the opposition known as leftist….¶ [T]here is vis­à­vis the established order, a relationship between the Churches that defended an other world and the parties of the left which, since the nineteenth century, have promoted a different future. In both cases, similar functional characteristics can be discerned….20¶ The Maoist retains many of Jane's awesome features, chief of which are a protestant passion to turn powerlessness into "truth" and an idealist intolerance of those who may think differently from her. Whereas the great Orientalist blames the living "third world" natives for the loss of the ancient non­Western civilization, his loved object, the Maoist applauds the same natives for personifying and fulfilling her ideals. For the Maoist in the 1970s, the mainland Chinese were, in spite of their "backwardness," a puritanical alternative to the West in human form—a dream come true.¶ In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the Maoist is disillusioned to watch the China they sanctified crumble before their eyes. This is the period in which we hear disapproving criticisms of contemporary Chinese people for liking Western pop music and consumer culture, or for being overly interested in sex. In a way that makes her indistinguishable from what at first seems a political enemy, the Orientalist, the Maoist now mourns the loss of her loved object—Socialist China—by pointing angrily at living "third world" natives. For many who have built their careers on the vision of Socialist China, the grief is tremendous. In the "cultural studies" of the American academy in the 1990s, the Maoist is reproducing with prowess. We see this in the way¶ 13¶ terms such as "oppression," "victimization," and "subalternity" are now being used. Contrary to Orientalist disdain for contemporary native cultures of the non­West, the Maoist turns precisely the "disdained'' other into the object of his/her study and, in some cases, identification. In a mixture of admiration and moralism, the Maoist sometimes turns all people from non­Western cultures into a generalized "subaltern" that is then used to flog an equally generalized "West." 21¶ Because the representation of "the other" as such ignores (1) the class and intellectual hierarchies within these other cultures, which are usually as elaborate as those in the West, and (2) the discursive power relations structuring the Maoist's mode of inquiry and valorization, it produces a way of talking in which notions of lack, subalternity, victimization, and so forth are drawn upon indiscriminately, often with the intention of spotlighting the speaker's own sense of alterity and political righteousness. A comfortably wealthy white American intellectual I know claimed that he was a "third world intellectual," citing as one of his credentials his marriage to a Western European woman of part­Jewish heritage; a professor of English complained about being "victimized" by the structured time at an Ivy League institution, meaning that she needed to be on time for classes; a graduate student of upper­class background from one of the world's poorest countries told his American friends that he was of poor peasant stock in order to authenticate his identity as a radical "third world" representative; male and female academics across the U.S. frequently say they were "raped" when they report experiences of professional frustration and conflict. Whether sincere or delusional, such cases of self­dramatization all take the route of self­subalternization, which has increasingly become the assured means to authority and power. What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and thus depriving the oppressed of even the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand. The oppressed, whose voices we seldom hear, are robbed twice—the first time of their economic chances, the second time of their language, which is now no longer distinguishable from those of us who have had our consciousnesses "raised."¶ In their analysis of the relation between violence and representation, Armstrong and Tennenhouse write: "[The] idea of violence ¶ 14¶ as representation is not an easy one for most academics to accept. It implies that whenever we speak for someone else we are inscribing her with our own (implicitly masculine) idea of order." 22 At present, this process of "inscribing" often means not only that we "represent" certain historic others because they are/were ''oppressed"; it often means that there is interest in representation only when what is represented can in some way be seen as lacking. Even though the Maoist is usually contemptuous of Freudian psychoanalysis because it is "bourgeois," her investment in oppression and victimization fully partakes of the Freudian and Lacanian notions of "lack." By attributing "lack," the Maoist justifies the "speaking for someone else" that Armstrong and Tennenhouse call "violence as representation."¶ As in the case of Orientalism, which does not necessarily belong only to those who are white, the Maoist does not have to be racially "white" either. The phrase "white guilt" refers to a type of discourse which continues to position power and lack against each other, while the narrator of that discourse, like Jane Eyre, speaks with power but identifies with powerlessness. This is how even those who come from privilege more often than not speak from/of/as its "lack." What the Maoist demonstrates is a circuit of productivity that draws its capital from others' deprivation while refusing to acknowledge its own presence as endowed. With the material origins of her own discourse always concealed, the Maoist thus speaks as if her charges were a form of immaculate conception.¶ The difficulty facing us, it seems to me, is no longer simply the "first world" Orientalist who mourns the rusting away of his treasures, but also students from privileged backgrounds Western and non­Western, who conform behaviorally in every respect with the elitism of their social origins (e.g., through powerful matrimonial alliances, through pursuit of fame, or through a contemptuous arrogance toward fellow students) but who nonetheless proclaim dedication to "vindicating the subalterns." My point is not that they should be blamed for the accident of their birth, nor that they cannot marry rich, pursue fame, or even be arrogant. Rather, it is that they choose to see in others' powerlessness an idealized image of themselves and refuse to hear in the dissonance between the content and manner of their speech their own complicity with violence. Even though these descendents of the Maoist may be quick to point¶ 15¶ out the exploitativeness of Benjamin Disraeli's "The East is a career," 23 they remain blind to their own exploitativeness as they make "the East" their career. How do we intervene in the productivity of this overdetermined circuit?

#### Capitalism is sustainable and self-correcting – no limits to growth or crunch points

Seabra 12 (Leo, has a background in Communication and Broadcasting and a broad experience which includes activities in Marketing, Advertising, Sales and Public Relations, 2/27, “Capitalism can drive Sustainability and also innovation,” http://seabraaffairs.wordpress.com/2012/02/27/capitalism-can-drive-sustainability-and-also-innovation/)

There are those who say that if the world does not change their habits, even the end of economic growth, and assuming alternative ways of living, will be a catastrophe. “Our lifestyles are unsustainable. Our expectations of consumption are predatory.Either we change this, or will be chaos”. Others say that the pursuit of unbridled economic growth and the inclusion of more people in consumption is killing the Earth. We have to create alternative because economic growth is pointing to the global collapse. “What will happen when billions of Chinese decide to adopt the lifestyle of Americans?” I’ll disagree if you don’t mind… They might be wrong. Completely wrong .. Even very intelligent people wrongly interpret the implications of what they observe when they lose the perspective of time. In the vast scale of time (today, decades, not centuries) it is the opposite of what expected, because they start from a false assumption: the future is the extrapolation of this. But not necessarily be. How do I know? Looking at history. What story? The history of innovation, this thing generates increases in productivity, wealth, quality of life in an unimaginable level. It is innovation that will defeat pessimism as it always did. It was innovation that made life today is incomparably better than at any other time in human history. And will further improve. Einstein, who was not a stupid person, believed that capitalism would generate crisis, instability, and growing impoverishment. He said: “The economic anarchy of capitalist society as it exists today is, in my opinion, the true source of evil.” The only way to eliminate this evil, he thought, was to establish socialism, with the means of production are owned by the company. A centrally controlled economy would adjust the production of goods and services the needs of people, and would distribute the work that needed to be done among those in a position to do so. This would guarantee a livelihood to every man, women and children. Each according to his possibilities. To each according to their needs. And guess what? What happened was the opposite of what Einstein predicted. Who tried the model he suggested, impoverished, screwed up. Peter Drucker says that almost of all thinking people of the late nineteenth century thought that Marx was right: there would be increased exploitation of workers by employers. They would become poorer, until one day, the thing would explode. Capitalist society was considered inherently unsustainable. It is more or less the same chat today. Bullshit. Capitalism, with all appropriate regulations, self-corrects. It is an adaptive system that learns and changes by design. The design is just for the system to learn and change. There was the opposite of what Einstein predicted, and held the opposite of what many predict, but the logic that “unlike” only becomes evident over time. It wasn’t obvious that the workers are those whom would profit from the productivity gains that the management science has begun to generate by organizing innovations like the railroad, the telegraph, the telephone .. to increase the scale of production and cheapen things. The living conditions of workers today are infinitely better than they were in 1900. They got richer, not poorer .. You do not need to work harder to produce more (as everyone thought), you can work less and produce more through a mechanism that is only now becoming apparent, and that brilliant people like Caetano Veloso still ignores. The output is pursuing growth through innovation, growth is not giving up. More of the same will become unsustainable to the planet, but most of it is not what will happen, will happen more different, than we do not know what is right. More innovative. Experts, such as Lester Brown, insist on statements like this: if the Chinese also want to have three cars for every four inhabitants, as in the U.S. today, there will be 1.1 billion cars there in 2030, and there is no way to build roads unless ends with the whole area used for agriculture. You will need 98 million barrels of oil per day, but the world only produces about 90 million today, and probably never produce much more. The mistake is to extrapolate today’s solutions for the future. We can continue living here for 20 years by exploiting the same resources that we explore today? Of course not. But the other question is: how can we encourage the stream of innovations that will enable the Chinese, Indians, Brazilians, Africans .. to live so as prosperous as Americans live today? Hey, wake up … what can not stop the engine of innovation is that the free market engenders. This system is self correcting, that is its beauty. We do not need to do nothing but ensure the conditions for it to work without distortion. The rest he does himself. It regulates itself.

#### Defend consequences – moral absolutism reproduces evil

Isaac 2 – (Jeffrey, Professor of PoliSci @ Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD Yale, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” Dissent Magazine Vol 49 Issue 2)

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law [it] can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### First, The attempt to save women in the world constitutes a mindset of the masculine, west saviors to the subaltern women – This reconstitutes the reproductive heteronormative drive within the US, but also reinforces the need for the other to reproduce and continue their culture in a heteronormative fashion

Spivak ’99 (Gayatri Chakravorty, Columbia, Can The Subaltern Speak?, Jcook.)

To mark the moment when not only a civil but a good society¶ is born out of domestic confusion, singular events that break the letter of¶ the law to instill its spirit are often invoked. The protection of women by¶ men often provides such an event. If we remember that the British boasted¶ of their absolute equity toward and noninterference with native customj¶ law, an invocation of this sanctioned transgression of the letter for the sake¶ of the spirit may be read in J. M. Derrett's remark: "The very first legislation¶ upon Hindu Law was carried through without the assent of a single Hindu."¶ The legislation is not named here. The next sentence, where the measure¶ is named, is equally interesting if one considers the implications of the¶ survival of a colonially established "good" society after decolonization: "The¶ recurrence of sati in independent India is probably an obscurantist revival¶ which cannot long survive even in a very backward part of the country."68¶ Whether this observation is correct or not, what interests me is¶ that the protection of woman (today the "third-world woman") becomes a¶ signifier for the establishment of a good society which must, at such in augurative¶ moments, transgress mere legality, or equity of legal policy. In this¶ particular case, the process also allowed the redefinition as a crime of what¶ had been tolerated, known, or adulated as ritual. In other words, this one¶ item in Hindu law jumped the frontier between the private and the public¶ domain.¶ Although Foucault's historical narrative, focusing solely on Western¶ Europe, sees merely a tolerance for the criminal antedating the development¶ of criminology in the late eighteenth century (PK, 41), his theoretical¶ description of the "episteme" is pertinent here: "The episteme is the 'apparatus'¶ which makes possible the separation not of the true from the false,¶ but of what may not be characterized as scientific" (PK, 197)-ritual as¶ opposed to crime, the one fixed by superstition, the other by legal science.¶ The leap of suttee from private to public has a clear and complex¶ relationship with the changeover from a mercantile and commercial to a¶ territorial and administrative British presence; it can be followed in correspondence¶ among the police stations, the lower and higher courts, the¶ courts of directors, the prince regent's court, and the like. (It is interesting¶ to note that, from the point of view of the native "colonial subject," also¶ emergent from the feudalism-capitalism transition, sati is a signifier with¶ the reverse social charge: "Groups rendered psychologically marginal by¶ their exposure to Western impact ... had come under pressure to demonstrate,¶ to others as well as to themselves, their ritual purity and allegiance¶ to traditional high culture. To many of them sati became an important¶ proof of their conformity to older norms at a time when these norms had¶ become shaky within. "69)¶

#### First, The pursuit of modern economics and US engagement has at its root *in domination and coloniality.* This perpetuates total war throughout the war in the pursuit of the plan. Worse, modern coloniality *cannot solve the problems* of the world – It’s outdated and works to reproduce the nation again and again, in reproductive heteronormativity – That turns case –

Escobar ’04 [Arturo, Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory and political ecology, “Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti-Globalization Social Movements”, <http://www3.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf>, JCook.] Acccessed 6/27/13.

1. Modernity’s ability to provide solutions to modern problems has been increasingly¶ compromised. In fact, it can be argued that there are no modern solutions to many of¶ today’s problems (Santos, 2002; Leff, 1998; Escobar, 2003b). This is clearly the case,¶ for instance, with massive displacement and ecological destruction, but also¶ development’s inability to fulfill its promise of a minimum of wellbeing for the world’s¶ people. At the basis of this modern incapacity lie both a hyper-technification of¶ rationality and a hyper-marketization of social life –what Santos (2002) refers to as the¶ increasing incongruence of the functions of social emancipation and social regulation.¶ The result is an oppressive globality in which manifold forms of violence increasingly¶ take on the function of regulation of peoples and economies. This feature has become¶ central to the neo-liberal approach of the American empire (even more so after the March¶ 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq). This modernist attempt at combating the symptoms but¶ not the cause of the social, political and ecological crises of the times results in multiple¶ “cruel little wars” in which the control of territories, people and resources is at stake¶ (Joxe, 2002). Regimes of selective inclusion and hyper-exclusion –of heightened poverty¶ for the many and skyrocketing wealth for the few—operating through spatial-military¶ logics, create a situation of widespread social fascism. The ever widening territories and¶ peoples subjected to precarious living conditions under social fascism suggest the¶ continued validity of a certain notion of a Third World, although not reducible to strict¶ geographical parameters. In short, the modern crisis is a crisis in models of thought, and¶ modern solutions, at least under neo-liberal globalization (NLG), only deepen the¶ problems. Moving beyond or outside modernity thus becomes a sine qua non for¶ imagining after the third world.

#### Second, Engage in border thinking. Border thinking is the redefinition of terms and ideas within a new epistemology, intended to redefine our thought in a new path away from Occidental, coloniality – That’s enough to solve the K and the aff

Grosfuguel ’11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, “Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of

Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality,” <http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf>, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.

One of many plausible solutions to the Eurocentric versus fundamentalist¶ dilemma is what Walter Mignolo, following Chicano(a) thinkers such as Gloria¶ Anzaldúa (1987) and Jose David Saldívar (1997), calls “critical border thinking”¶ (Mignolo 2000). Critical border thinking is the epistemic response of the subaltern to¶ the Eurocentric project of modernity. Instead of rejecting modernity to retreat into a¶ fundamentalist absolutism, border epistemologies subsume/redefines the¶ emancipatory rhetoric of modernity from the cosmologies and epistemologies of the¶ subaltern, located in the oppressed and exploited side of the colonial difference,¶ towards a decolonial liberation struggle for a world beyond eurocentered modernity.¶ What border thinking produces is a redefinition/subsumption of citizenship,¶ democracy, human rights, humanity, and economic relations beyond the narrow¶ definitions imposed by European modernity. Border thinking is not an anti-modern¶ fundamentalism. It is a decolonial transmodern response of the subaltern to¶ Eurocentric modernity. But border thinking is just one expression of epistemic¶ decolonization in this case following the Chicano colonial experience inside the US¶ Empire. There are other decolonial notions such as diasporic thought, autonomous¶ thought, thinking from the margins, thinking from Pachamama, etc. articulated from¶ other colonial experiences.¶ A good example of this is the Zapatista struggle in Mexico. The Zapatistas are¶ not anti-modern fundamentalist. They do not reject democracy and retreat into some¶ form of indigenous fundamentalism. On the contrary, the Zapatistas accept the¶ notion of democracy, but redefine it from a local indigenous practice and cosmology,¶ conceptualizing it as “commanding while obeying” or “we are all equals because we¶ are all different.” What seems to be a paradoxical slogan is really a critical¶ decolonial redefinition of democracy from the practices, cosmologies and¶ epistemologies of the subaltern. This leads to the question of how to transcend the¶ imperial monologue established by the European-centric modernity.

#### The negative is colonial – they universalize the experiences of Western women

Goetz, research fellow in Development studies at U of Sussex, 91 (Anne Goetz, “Gender and International Relations,” Harper and Row, 1991)

Third world women have accused first word and western-trained feminists of exercising a certain cultural colonialism, of misrepresenting different women by homogenizing the experiences and conditions of western women across time and culture. Chakravorty Spivak has shown that western women are “complicitous” in contributing to the continued ‘degredation’ of third world women whose micrology they interpret without having access to it. Monica Lazreg, exploring the ‘perils of writing as a woman on women in Algeria’ suggests that third world women have been produced as a field of knowledge, essentializing their difference in a process that represents a ‘caricature of the feminist project’. Black feminists have accused white feminists of adding on difference at the margin ‘without leaving the comforts of home’ so as to support ‘the seeming homogeneity, stability, and self-evidence of its experience based epistemology’. Trinh T. Minh-ha identifies this neutralized difference as ‘the very kind of colonized anthropologised difference the master has always granted his subordinates’. Audre Lorde’s response to the universalized picture of oppression in Mary Dali’s Gym/Ecology reproaches her for failing: “to recognize that, as women… differences expose all women to various forms and degrees of patriarchal oppression, some of which we share, some of which we do not… The oppression of women knows no ethnic nor racial boundaries, true, but that does not mean that it is identical within those boundaries… to imply… that all women suffer the same oppression simply because we are women is to lose sight of the many varied tools of patriarchy. It is to ignore how these tools are used by women without awareness against each other.” These statements amount to descriptions of an epistemologically totalizing and culturally disruptive feminist. And to the extend that feminist theory’s claim to relevance is based upon its claim to represent the meaning of women’s social experience in all its heterogeneity, these critiques point to some fundamental problems. The original consciousness raising approach of traditional feminist – what Catherine MacKinnon has called its critical method – involved a project of theorizing the collective expression of the social constitution of sexed identities. This was informed by a political understanding that gender was not an inalienable description of human reality; an understanding derived from the insights of a traditional feminist ideology whose analysis of the political meaning of experience was concerned with deconstructing the legitimating surface of women’s oppression. Theorizing the social construction of subjectivity produced an understanding of the mechanisms of sexist oppression. In practice, and as seen above, particularly in the context of WID practice, that collective critical reconstitution of women’s experiences in traditional feminist movements has tended to reproduce the situational consciousness of the white, bourgeois, heterosexual feminist, developing a set of certainties structured around that specific subjectivity. Such certainties in liberal or Marxist feminist ideologies tended to inform the cross-cultural investigations of sexual subordination, producing a certain myopia with respect to the details of sexual subordination in different societies. The failure to guide practice with reference to the processes that shape human perceptions and norms promoted the disintegration of feminist pronouncements on women in development into a norm setting activity by a counter-elite.

#### Gender must be rejected as a category for mobilization. Emancipatory gender models can only reify existing power relations.

Butler 99 (Judith Butler, Professor of Humanities, Johns Hopkins University, GENDER TROUBLE, 1999, 94)

In the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault argues that the univocal construct of “sex (one is one’s sex and, therefore, not the other) is (a) produced in the service of the social regulation and control of sexuality and (b) conceals and artificially unifies a variety of disparate and unrelated sexual functions and then (c) postures within discourse as a cause, an inferior essence which both produces and renders intelligible all manner of sensation, pleasure and desire as sex-specific. In other words, bodily pleasures are not merely casually reducible to this ostensibly sex-specific essence, but they become readily interpretable as manifestations or signs of this “sex.” In opposition to this false construction of sex as both univocal and casual, Foucault engages a reverse-discourse which treats sex as an effect rather than an origin. In the place of “sex” as the original and continuous case and signification of bodily pleasures, he proposes “sexuality” as an open and complex historical system of discourse and power that produces the misnomer of “sex” as part of a strategy to conceal and, hence, to perpetuate power-relations. One way in which power is both perpetuated and concealed is through the establishment of an external or arbitrary relation between power, conceived as repression or domination, and sex, conceived as a brave but thwarted energy waiting for release or authentic self-expression. The use of this juridical model presumes that the relation between power and sexuality is not only ontologically distinct, but that power always and only works to subdue or liberate a sex which is fundamentally intact, self-sufficient, and other than power itself. When “sex” is essentially in this way, it becomes ontologically immunized from power relations and from its own historicity. As a result, the analysis of sexuality is collapsed into the analysis of “sex,” and any inquiry into the historical production of the category of “sex” itself is precluded by this inverted ad falsifying causality. According to Foucault, “sex” must not only be contextualized within the terms of sexuality, but juridical power must be reconceived as a construction produced by a generative power which, in turn, conceals the mechanism of is own productivity. The notion of sex brought about a fundamental reversal; it made it possible to invert the representation of the relationships of power to sexuality, causing the latter to appear, not in its essential and positive relation to power, but as being rooted in a specific and irreducible urgency which power tries as best it can to dominate. Foucault explicitly takes a stand against emancipatory or liberationist models of sexuality in The History of Sexuality because they subscribe to a juridical model that does not acknowledge the historical production of “sex” as a category, that is, as a mystifying “effect” of power relations. His ostensible problem with feminism seems also to emerge here: Where feminist analysis takes the category of sex and, thus, according to him, the binary restriction of gender as its point of departure. Foucault understands his own project to be an inquiry into how the category of “sex” and sexual difference are constructed within discourse as necessary features of bodily identity. The juridical model of law which structures the feminist emancipatory model presumes, in his view, that the subject of emancipation, “the sexed boy” in some sense is not itself in need of a critical deconstruction. As Foucault remarks about some humanist efforts at prison reform, the criminal subject who gets emancipated may be even more deeply shackled than the humanist originally thought. To be sexed, for Foucault, is to be subjected to a set of social regulations, to have the law that directs those regulations reside both as the formative principle of one’s sex, gender, pleasures and desires and as the hermeneutic principle of self-interpretation. The category of sex is thus inevitably regulative, and any analysis which makes that category pre-suppositional uncritically extends and further legitimates that regulative strategy as a power knowledge regime.

# 2NC

#### First, Your criticism ignores the subaltern voice that is deeply intertwined in the division of labor – This makes the subaltern silent as well as re-entrenches in the foundation of oppression that allowed capitalism to take hold – Turns the criticism

Spivak ’99 (GayatriChakravorty, Columbia, Can The Subaltern Speak?,Jcook.)

Some of the most radical criticism coming out of the¶ West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of¶ the West, or the West as SUbject. The theory of pluralized "subject-effects"¶ gives an illusion of undermining SUbjective sovereignty while often providing¶ a cover for this subject of knowledge. Although the history of Europe¶ as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the¶ West, this concealed Subject pretends it has "no geo-political determina-¶tions." The much-publicized critique of the sovereign subject thus actually¶ inaugurates a Subject. I will argue for this conclusion by considering a text¶ by two great practitioners of the critique: "Intellectuals and Power: A Conversation¶ between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. "3¶ I have chosen this friendly exchange between two activist philosophers¶ of history because it undoes the opposition between authoritative¶ theoretical production and the unguarded practice of conversation, enabling¶ one to glimpse the track of ideology. The participants in this conversation¶ emphasize the most important contributions of French poststructuralist theory:¶ first, that the networks of power/desire/interest are so heterogeneous¶ that their reduction to a coherent narrative is counterproductive-a persistent¶ critique is needed; and second, that intellectuals must attempt to¶ disclose and know the discourse of society's Other. Yet the two systematically¶ ignore the question of ideology and their own implication in intellectual¶ and economic history.¶ Although one of its chief presuppositions is the critique of the¶ sovereign subject, the conversation between Foucault and Deleuze is framed¶ by two monolithic and anonymous subjects-in-revolution: "A Maoist" (FD,¶ 205) and "the workers' struggle" (FD, 217). Intellectuals, however, are named¶ and differentiated; moreover, a Chinese Maoism is nowhere operative.¶ Maoism here simply creates an aura of narrative specificity, which would¶ be a harmless rhetorical banality were it not that the innocent appropriation¶ of the proper name "Maoism" for the eccentric phenomenon of French¶ intellectual "Maoism" and subsequent "New Philosophy" symptomatically¶ renders "Asia" transparent.4¶Deleuze's reference to the workers' struggle is equally problematic;¶ it is obviously a genuflection: "We are unable to touch [power] in¶ any point of its application without finding ourselves confronted by this¶ diffuse mass, so that we are necessarily led ... to the desire to blow it up¶ completely. Every partial revolutionary attack or defense is linked in this¶ way to the workers' struggle" (FD, 217). The apparent banality signals a¶ disavowal. The statement ignores the international division of labor, a gesture¶ that often marks poststructuralist political theory.5 The invocation of¶ the workers' struggle is baleful in its very innocence; it is incapable of dealing¶ with global capitalism: the sUbject-production of worker and unemployed¶ within nation-state ideologies in its Center; the increasing subtraction of the¶ working class in the Periphery from the realization of surplus value and¶ thus from "humanistic" training in consumerism; and the large-scale presence¶ of paracapitalist labor as well as the heterogeneous structural status of¶ agriculture in the Periphery. Ignoring the international division of labor;¶ rendering "Asia" (and on occasion "Africa") transparent (unless the subject¶ is ostensibly the "Third World"); reestablishing the legal subject of socialized¶ capital-these are problems as common to much poststructuralist as to structuralist¶ theory. Why should such occlusions be sanctioned in precisely those¶ intellectuals who are our best prophets of heterogeneity and the Other?¶ The link to the workers' struggle is located in the desire to blow¶ up power at any point of its application. This site is apparently based on a¶ simple valorization of any desire destructive of any power. Walter Benjamin¶ comments on Baudelaire's comparable politics by way of quotations from¶ Marx:¶ Marx continues in his description of the conspirateurs¶ de profession as follows: " ... They have no other aim¶ but the immediate one of overthrowing the existing¶government, and they profoundly despise the more¶ theoretical enlightenment of the workers as to their¶ class interests. Thus their anger-not proletarian but¶ plebian-at the habits noirs (black coats), the more or¶ less educated people who represent [vertretenjthat side¶ of the movement and of whom they can never become¶ entirely independent, as they cannot of the official representatives¶ [Reprasentantenjof the party." Baudelaire's¶ political insights do not go fundamentally beyond¶ the insights of these professional conspirators ....¶ He could perhaps have made Flaubert's statement, "Of¶ all of politics I understand only one thing: the revolt,"¶ his own.6

#### ( ) The pursuit of the West to help Latin American nations is merely an attempt to hide the responsibility the West has for creating the conditions seen in the region. This rhetoric of “underdevelopment” and economic intervention into these problem regions perpetuate the growing domination of coloniality

Grosfuguel ’11 [Ramon, University of Cal. Berkeley, “Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of**¶** Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality,” <http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf>, JCook.] Accessed 6/25/13.

Although the dependentistas struggled against these universalist/Occidentalist¶ forms of knowledge, they perceived this knowledge as a “superstruture” or an¶ epiphenomenon of some “economic infrastructure”. Dependentistas never perceived¶ this knowledge as constitutive of Latin America’s political-economy. Constructing¶ peripheral zones such as Africa and Latin America as “regions with a “problem” or¶ with a “backward stage of development” concealed European and Euro-American¶ responsibility in the exploitation of these continents. The construction of¶ “pathological” regions in the periphery as opposed to the so-called “normal”¶ development patterns of the “West” justified an even more intense political and¶ economic intervention from imperial powers. By treating the “Other” as¶ “underdeveloped” and “backward,” metropolitan exploitation and domination were¶ justified in the name of the “civilizing mission.”

#### First, Policies that use identity politics to at aiding marginalized groups are used to change the subalteran's life in a way that suits the needs of the globalized world, reproducing the problem and reproductive heteronormativity - empirically proven

Spivak February 2012 - Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, "An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization", Published 2-27-2012

The construction of the postcolonial subject was to code the failure of decolonization as multiculturalism, in metropolitan space, to race, itself rewritten as a fantasmatic national identity as its subject. So if the first was class the second is race as multiculture-cultural rights. Identitarian politics succeeds insofar as class and gender remain subsumed to this notion of a national and postnational identity. The construction, on the other hand, of the globalized subject is through the manufacturing of a gender alliance. The female subject/agent of globalization often collectively legitimatizes itself in the name of a generalized ethical agenda. This is where she crosses the capital/culture aporia on the side of capital. Yet to work for global justice as a principle is as right a decision as to work for strategy-driven globalization. But the interests of globalization from above and from below cancel each other. This too contributes to the problem of thinking ethics for the other woman. In 1998, National Geographic showed pictures of women saluting the male fieldworkers of the Grameen Bank as they vow not to have too many children. 13 Will mainstream feminism ever think critically of this model of cultural indoctrination, even as Grameen gets more savvy? Different officers of Women's World Banking repeatedly invoke Chandra Behn, a member of the celebrated Self Employed Women's Association or SEWA, as their legitimation. At the same time, they speak of opening "the huge untapped market of poor Southern women to the international commercial sector." When SEWA was founded in the early 1960s, Ela Bhatt, the founder, had no such ambition. "The World Bank's [Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest] ... appears to be narrowly focused on microlending as an end in itself. And the means to that end, critics charge, may do more damage to 'empowerment leaders' like SEWA than good." 14 This was the placing of the poorest women of the South upon the spectral grid of finance capital. "Pay up every week or else" is once again the instrumentalization of body and the money-form in the interest of the abstract. SEWA had made the subaltern women co-operative owners of their own bank, precisely to bypass the predations of commercial capital as they started life changes: driving by strategy, not driven by crisis management. Under the initiator Ela Bhatt's fierce left-labor Gandhianism, the free-choice cultural-identity slot was anti-Fordist, hi-religious (Muslim/Hindu) worker's pride, which lasts to this day, although one senses a certain unease now, among the working-class Hindu women, in pronouncing the "la ilaha ... "-there is no God but God-the Muslim credo.

#### First, Ethical Interruptions of the systematic norm are the only way to make lasting change to prevent the inevitable violence that the case focuses on – AND – Only the alternative alone can solve – The openness to the other runs counter to state action and combinatory actsGayatriChakravorty **Spivak ‘08**, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, 2004 “Terror: A Speech After 9-11” Published by Duke University Press. boundary 2 31.2 (2004) 81-111 Access provided by University of Minnesota -Twin Cities Libraries—Project Muse 10/8/2008.

Yet, being a citizen of the world who aspires to live and prosper under¶ ‘‘the rule of law,’’ I will risk a word. When we believe that to punish the per-¶petrators as criminals would be smarter than, or even more correct than,¶ military intervention, we are not necessarily moving toward a lasting peace.¶ Unless we are trained into imagining the other, a necessary, impossible,¶ and interminable task, nothing we do through politico-legal calculation will¶ last, even with the chanciness of the future anterior: something will have¶ been when we plan a something will be. Before the requirement of the emergence¶ of a specific sort of ‘‘public sphere’’—corollary to imperial systems¶ and the movement of peoples, when different ‘‘kinds’’ of people came to live¶ together—such training was part of general cultural instruction.3 After, it has¶ become the especial burden of an institutionalized faculty of the humanities.¶ I squash an entire history here. Kant’s enlightened subject is a scholar.4 In¶ ‘‘Critique of Power’’ Benjamin writes, ‘‘what stands outside of the law as the¶ educative power in its perfected form, is one of the forms of appearance of¶ divine power.’’5 I happen to be a Europeanist, but I have no doubt at all that¶historically marked intuitions about the importance of the educative moment¶ is to be found in every cultural system. What seems important today, in the¶ face of this unprecedented attack on the temple of Empire, is not only an¶ unmediated intervention by way of the calculations of the public sphere—¶ war or law—but training (the exercise of the educative power) into a preparation¶ for the eruption of the ethical. I understand the ethical, and this is a¶ derivative position, to be an interruption of the epistemological, which is the¶ attempt to construct the other as object of knowledge. Epistemological constructions¶ belong to the domain of the law, which seeks to know the other,¶ in his or her case, as completely as possible, in order to punish or acquit¶ rationally, reason being defined by the limits set by the law itself. The ethical¶ interrupts this imperfectly, to listen to the other as if it were a self, neither to¶ punish nor to acquit.

#### Second, Only by imagining and investigating our cultural imaginations allows us to solve the root cause of the problem – Any other solution re-entrenches the problem, turning case

Spivak ’04, Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, 2004 “Terror: A Speech After 9-11” Published by Duke University Press. boundary 2 31.2 (2004) 81-111 Access provided by University of Minnesota -Twin Cities Libraries—Project Muse 10/8/2008.

I am also not suggesting that political analyses and resistances and,¶ on another level, aid and human rights, are unnecessary. I am suggesting¶ that if in the imagination we do not make the attempt to figure the other¶ as imaginative actant, political (and military) solutions will not remove the¶ binary which led to the problem in the first place. Hence cultural instruction¶ in the exercise of the imagination.¶ Even within this suggestion, I am not describing all the acts of September¶ 11, 2001, as ‘‘sublime’’ in the Kantian sense. It is an imaginative exercise¶ in experiencing the impossible—stepping into the space of the other—¶ without which political solutions come drearily undone into the continuation¶ of violence. To paraphrase Devi: ‘‘there are many to offer political analyses¶ and solutions, but no one to light the fire.’’ Cultural instructions through the¶ imagination in time of war is seen, at best, as aestheticization and, at worst,¶ as treason. But that too is situational.

#### The Kritik turns their feminism advantage as well as accomplishing the break down of gender norms

Spivak and Mookherjee ’12 (Gayatri and Nayanika. “Reproductive Heteronormativity and Sexual Violence in the Bangladesh War of 1971”, Social Text 111.Vol. 30, No. 2. Summer 2012.)

GayatriChakravortySpivak has been working with an organization¶ in Bangladesh which focuses on ecological farming and the struggle against¶ forced contraception (in particular, the dumping of Depo-Provera and¶ other pharmaceuticals). She has also been part of this organization’s educational¶ program for women and teacher training course in rural Bangladesh.¶ In her own work she has written critically about the various interventionist¶ and savior paradigms of transnational organizations in Bangladesh, which¶ she has referred to as an “enabling violation — of that of the production of¶ the subject.”1 In this context she has been critical of “gender training” —¶ the label given by international organizations to processes that seemingly¶ “empower” women and give them a “voice.” Spivak first went to Bangladesh¶ while she was accompanying her mother, SivaniChakravorty, on a¶ visit to one of these rehabilitation centers, and took photographs of the¶ women and the rehabilitation program in Dhaka in January 1973 (see page¶ 121 and fig. 1). The following discussion highlights the personal, political,¶ and intellectual context within which Spivak undertook this visit to¶ Bangladesh, along with a deconstructive reading of sexual violence during¶ wars, which she refers to as the “tacit globalization of reproductive heteronormativity.”¶ This discussion was interspersed with looking through¶ numerous photo albums with Spivak, searching for and talking through¶ photographs of women.¶gayatrichakravortyspivak I don’t quite know where to begin in this¶ introduction, Nayanika. Derrida has this idea of destinerrance — that a¶ thing always errs away from its destination, and I feel that pulling these¶ pictures up from 71/72 has been almost an allegory of that. These pic¶tures were not records of anything for me — I should say here I am not a¶ photographer. I am completely excited by and committed to the unverifiable.¶ On the other hand, in the deepest possible way I am dedicated¶ to “entering the protocols of their episteme,” attempting to inhabit the¶ often-metaphorical¶syncategoremes that link their presuppositions, as one¶ enters the text one reads, which is a very different thing. As you will see,¶ these pictures are poor pictures. They were taken because we were there.¶ My mother and I were involved in working for the establishment¶ of Bangladesh as a state. We did publicity — we talked to the women a¶ lot — but not to interview, but to energize, to understand, to explain. I don’t¶ know whether you have heard me say this since you saw me at Cambridge,¶ that reproductive heteronormativity — the para-reasonable¶ assumption¶ that producing children by male-female¶ coupling gives meaning to any¶ life — is the oldest, biggest sustaining institution in the world, a tacit globalizer.¶ And war and rape belong there. Now you will see the picture of one¶ young woman who was completely unhinged, never spoke a word at all — I¶ felt she was completely unhinged — which is also a Derridean thing — out¶ of joint. The “out of place” (atopos), following Socrates, is assigned a¶ certain gentle wisdom. Nietzsche assigns to postreproductive women a¶ certain cynical wisdom. Antigone, voluble, honorary male, is, says Lacan,¶ “beyond Ate.” All these narratives were useless to describe her. I never¶ followed up on these pictures — this is not my work, it was a “literary”¶ or disciplinary disinclination to turn her into my object of investigation.¶This is something that happened on the way. This is almost for me like¶ a primal scene of activism — I did not even think so till you and I began¶ talking about this. I am reading Frederick Douglass, and there is again and¶ again what could be a primal scene; as a slave he was denied the so-called¶ normal access to reproductive heteronormativity. So these are images of¶ bare-chested¶ women being whipped until they bleed uncontrollably, and¶ I was realizing we need these kinds of scenes that are originary and not¶ rationalized into what we later do.¶nayanikamookherjee I wanted to ask you about what you said about these¶ images as being of the epistemic originary.¶My analogy for the originary is a stick-shift¶ car: every time you start the¶ car you take the clutch out — it is somewhere which remains lodged — as¶ the first necessary move, so it is not origin. I feel as if what happened¶ unselfconsciously as I faced these women was a reference to, or a representation¶ of, the originary in the field of my work for reading the world. I¶ didn’t try it with these women; I wasn’t ready. I feel that silent unreading¶ of the scene of violation was originary to all this. It was, as it were, a lesson¶ not to read too soon.¶ want to come back to the point of images. There is a certain kind of standardization¶ of images that has happened in terms of wartime experiences to the¶ extent that people feel bored about it — the citational point about the “enemy.”¶ Yes and through this the feeling is that once dealt with they need not be¶ brought up again. I am glad you brought this up. I am talking about this¶ entire construct which contained my approach to it — and I had no plan.¶ And we hadn’t gone to do this. What I am talking about is preimagistic. I¶ do not “follow” Freud, but Freud is very canny — he says that the dream¶ in its work has to start with words but it slowly undoes the word’s worthiness.¶ Freud is talking about the fact that in the dream the significance-quality¶ of the image is undone, the meaning making of the image gets¶ undone — in order that the dreamer can dream the very last thing the¶ dream does, the dream work does, making a representation. It conceals¶ all this work by producing a dream narrative. It is this dream narrative¶ that I am talking about.¶ I want to show you the pictures first. It is interesting to me that¶ they are mixed in with other pictures — let me get a bigger table for the¶ photographs. I want to show you the picture of the woman who was completely¶ muted. I believe this is she. I have forgotten her name — there are¶ two pictures which are nearly the same. These are awful pictures — these¶ are some of the women, and this is of that woman who was always quiet.¶ The photographs are of January ’73. I don’t know if these pictures mean¶ anything to you.¶ The settings of these images are similar to images other Bangladeshi social¶ workers have. Maybe you could tell me how you went with your mother to¶ Bangladesh — what triggered it off.¶ That is interesting indeed. I was of that immediately postcolonial generation¶ that went to Presidency College in Calcutta in 1957. I was always¶ engaged with whatever was going on — that was not new. I came to the¶ US in 1961, and I would say that the first couple of years I was slightly¶ detached from what was on the ground. Although during that time James¶ Brown and Malcolm X debated at Cornell, Schwerner and his associates¶ went down south and were killed in Mississippi. There was a lot of stuff¶ going on. But since I am not someone who would want to join for joining,¶ I wasn’t cluing in. And then came the Vietnam War and I was a bit¶ more senior, right? ’65 — I became an assistant prof, and I found myself¶ completely sucked into the anti–Vietnam¶ War movement. And one of the¶ things that kept not just me but most of the international students on the¶ left separate from it a little was our conviction that people with whom¶ we were struggling — SDS, DSOC, NAM [Students for a Democratic¶ Society, Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee, and New American¶ Movement] — they seemed more interested in reclaiming America¶ than entering the protocol of the episteme of the Vietcong: how Marx¶ is transformed in Asia — the atopos in Socrates — that was not the story.¶ Because student activists tend to cluster and I was becoming quite visible¶ and I was clearly a Bengali — into this came the Bangladeshi activists¶ abroad, who were working very hard. This was in Iowa — the Midwest¶ was a solid base of the anti–Vietnam¶ War movement. And so it was there¶ that the Bangladeshis and I found each other. I remember the guy called¶SayadAlam — the day that Bangladesh was proclaimed and there was a¶ huge celebration at our house, March ’71. And so I was in contact with¶ my mother in Calcutta — Mother had often said to me that the best days¶ of her life were spent in Dhaka.¶ My father’s name was Pares Chandra Chakravorty, and my mother’s¶ name was SivaniChakravorty. So what happened was — my father was¶ asked by the British government to give false evidence in a rape trial in¶ 1941 in Dhaka, and in a second he destroyed his career by refusing. Of¶ course, Mother remembered the entire narrative vividly. After that my¶ father left Dhaka. My mother’s grandmother Barahini Debi was given in¶ widow remarriage. Her father was a friend of IswarchandraVidyasagar,¶ the great nineteenth-century¶ Bengali reformer. Brahmins in my father’s¶ village had therefore felt that my father’s father had lost his Brahminical¶ standing by giving his son into such a rule-breaking¶ household. So he tore¶ his sacred thread and vowed never to come back to the village again. My¶ mother had never seen my father’s birthplace. All of these stories have to¶ do with the cultural policing of reproductive heteronormativity. A widow¶ remarried is akin to a rape victim, a transgressor. So now, coming to talk¶ to you, I realize this inventory without traces, Gramsci’s great formula for¶ the historiography of the subaltern.¶ I get my political passion from both my parents, and the entire narrative¶ was in my mother’s mind. As this drama was being played in Iowa¶ by me thirty years later, my mother said we should go to Bangladesh and¶ she started to make contacts. So in ’71 Mother and I together went to¶ Bangladesh, and this was just about the end — well, the bridges were still¶ down. So my chronology is not accurate — this was not being undertaken¶ for any academic transcoding. It was an emotional thing — mother and¶ daughter going back to where mother had been happiest. Going back to¶ where no one in the family had been after 1940. It was extremely exciting¶ and Mother’s MA was in Bengali literature and she could speak all of¶ the dialects. As we are going north I understand my mother tongue less¶ and less. My Bengali is not bad, but she was becoming the interpreter¶ and she was talking to them, whereas I could not talk and I could not¶ understand either. So it was very much a women’s emotional journey. Into¶ this — because she had clearly worked in the women’s sector, and while I¶ had worked in the general new-nation¶ sector — like the anti – Vietnam War¶ movement — I began to discover that through her I met lots of groups of¶ upper-middle-class¶ nationalist women. The PunorbashonKendras (rehabilitation¶ centers) that you mentioned approached Mother, and I went¶ along. That is how it happened. I was twenty-nine.¶ I hadn’t begun any of¶ my activist work of the mid-80s¶ — that was much later. And so I was very¶ much my mother’s assistant.

#### Aff is responsible for their representations and forces a flawed ontology - the act of reading forces one to construct a self in opposition to their own [also can be used as a perm card if its something to the effect of all other instances or do both since it focuses on the role of the affs literature]

Spivak February 2012 - Gayatri Chakravorty, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University and the director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University, "An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization", Published 2-27-2012, PG 58

Writing and reading in such general senses mark two different positions in relation to the uneven many-strandedness of "being." Writing is a position where the absence of the weaver from the web is structurally necessary. Reading is a position where I (or a group of us with whom I share an identificatory label) make this anonymous web my own, even as I find in it a guarantee of my existence as me, one of us. Between the two positions, there are displacements and consolidations, a disjunction in order to conjugate a representative self. (Even solitude is framed in a representation of absent others.) In the arena of cultural politics, whose disciplinary condition and effect are history, anthropology, and cultural studies, this disjunction/conjunction is often ignored. The socius, it is claimed, is not woven in the predication of writing, not text-ile. It is further claimed that, when we push ourselves, or the objects of our study, forward as agents of an alternative history, our own emergence into the court of claims is not dependent upon the transformation and displacement of writing into something readable. By that reasoning, we simply discover or uncover the socius and secure the basis of cultural or ethnic power through the claim to knowledge. By that reasoning, power is collective, institutional, political validation. I do not advise giving up this practical notion of power. If, however, we "remake history" only through this limited notion of power as collective validation, we might allow ourselves to become instruments of the crisis-management of the old institutions, the old politics. We forget at our peril that we get out of joint with the pretext, the writing of our desire for validation, which one can only grasp by being "nominalistic, no doubt: power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength some are endowed with; it is the name that one lends to a complex strategical situation in a particular society," so that one can read that writing. 3

#### Alternative text: The United States federal government should engage in a process of harnessing responsibility for accountability, check up on other directedness without persistent training and feudalism. We reserve the right to clarify.

#### This solves human rights, 1AC and gender oppression – It also avoids Social Darwinism, Essentialism, and the exacerbation of 1AC harms through the affirmatives inevitable propagation of colonial education

Spivak 04 (Gayatri. Summer 2004, “Righting Wrongs”, *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Volume 103, Number 2/3, Spring/Summer 2004, pp. 523-581, TvB)

The idea of human rights, in other words, may carry within itself the agenda of a kind of social Darwinism—the fittest must shoulder the burden of righting the wrongs of the unfit—and the possibility of an alibi.Only a ‘‘kind of ’’ Social Darwinism, of course. Just as ‘‘the white man’s burden,’’ undertaking to civilize and develop, was only ‘‘a kind of ’’ oppression. It would be silly to footnote the scholarshipthat has been written to showthat the latter may have been an alibi for economic, military, and political intervention. It is on that model that I am using the concept-metaphor of the alibi in these introductory paragraphs.¶ Having arrived here, the usual thing is to complain about the Eurocentrism of human rights. I have no such intention. I am of course troubled by the use of human rights as an alibi for interventions of various sorts. But its so-called European provenance is for me in the same category as the ‘‘enabling violation’’ of the production of the colonial subject.3 One cannot write off the righting of wrongs. The enablement must be used even as the violation is renegotiated.¶Colonialism was committed to the education of a certain class. It was interested in the seemingly permanent operation of an altered normality. Paradoxically, human rights and ‘‘development’’ work today cannot claim this self-empowerment that high colonialism could. Yet, some of the best products of high colonialism, descendants of the colonial middle class, become human rights advocatesin the countries of the South. I will explain through an analogy.¶ Doctors without Frontiers—I find this translation more accurate than the received Doctors without Borders—dispense healing all over the world, traveling to solve health problems as they arise. They cannotbe involved in the repetitive work of primary health care, which requires changes in the habit of what seems normal living: permanent operation of an altered normality. This group cannot learn all the local languages, dialects, and idioms of the places where they provide help. They use local interpreters. It is as if, in the field of class formation through education, colonialism, and the attendant territorial imperialism had combined these two imperatives—clinic and primary health care—by training the interpreters themselves into imperfect yet creative imitations of the doctors. The class thus formed—both(pseudo)doctor and interpreter, as it were—was the colonial subject.¶ The end of the Second World War inaugurated the postcolonial dispensation. ¶ We must question the assumption that, if the sense of doing for the other is not produced on call from a sense of the self as sovereign, packaged with the sense of being fittest, the alternative assumption, romantic or expedient, of an essence of subalternity as the source of such a sense, denies the depradations of history. Paulo Freire, in his celebrated Pedagogy of the Oppressed, written during the era of guerilla warfare in Latin America, warns us against subalternist essentialism, by reminding us that, ‘‘during the initial stages of the struggle, the oppressed. . . tend themselves to become oppressors.’’ 64¶ In addition, in the faceof UN Human Rights policy-making, we must be on guard against subalternist essentialism, both positive and negative. If the self-permission for continuing to right wrongs is premised implicitly on the former—they will never be able to help themselves—the latter nourishes false hopes that willas surely be dashed and lead to the same result: an unwilling conclusion that they must always be propped up. Indeed, in the present state of the world, or perhaps always and everywhere, simply harnessing responsibility for accountability in the South, checking up on other directedness, as it were, without the persistent training, of ‘‘no guarantees,’’ were produce and consolidate what can only be called ‘‘feudalism,’’ where a benevolent despot like Lee Kuan Yew can claim collectivity rather than individualism when expedient. In the present state of the world, it also reproduces and consolidates gender oppression, thus lending plausibility to the instant right speak of the gender lobby of the international civil society and Bretton Woods.

# 1NR

#### The battle for the public sphere is over—we lost – the left and right are now two sides of the same coin – and all institutional power exists only to suppress dissent – the only sphere with left is the space of the opaque

The Invisible Committee, ‘7 [an anonymous group of French professors, phd candidates, and intellectuals, in the book “The Coming Insurrection” published by Semiotext(e) (attributed to the [Tarnac Nine](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tarnac_Nine) by the French police), <http://tarnac9.noblogs.org/gallery/5188/insurrection_english.pdf>]

**Whatever angle you look at it from, there's no escape from the present.** That's not the least of its virtues. For those who want absolutely to have hope, **it knocks down every support.** **Those who claim to have solutions are proven wrong almost immediatel**y. It's understood that now **everything can only go from bad to worse.** "**There's no future for the future**" is the wisdom behind an era that for all its appearances of extreme normalcy has come to have about the consciousness level of the first punks. **The sphere of political representation is closed. From left to right, it's the same nothingness** acting by turns either as the big shots or the virgins, the same sales shelf heads, **changing up their discourse according to the latest dispatches from the information service**. Those who still vote give one the impression that their only intention is to knock out the polling booths by voting as a pure act of protest. And we've started to understand that in fact **it’s only against the vote itself that people go on voting. Nothing we've seen can come up to the heights of the present situation; not by far.** By its very silence, the populace seems infinitely more 'grown up' than all those squabbling amongst themselves to govern it do. Any Belleville chibani 1 is wiser in his chats than in all of those puppets’ grand declarations put together. The lid of the social kettle is triple-tight, and the pressure inside won’t stop building. The ghost of Argentina’s Que Se Vayan Todos 2 is seriously starting to haunt the ruling heads. **The fires of November 2005 will never cease to cast their shadow on all consciences.** Those first joyous fires were the baptism of a whole decade full of promises. The media’s “suburbs vs. the Republic” myth, if it’s not inefficient, is certainly not true. The fatherland was ablaze all the way to downtown everywhere, with fires that were methodically snuffed out. **Whole streets went up in flames of solidarity in Barcelona and no one but the people who lived there even found out about it.** And the country hasn’t stopped burning since. Among the accused we find diverse profiles, without much in common besides a hatred for existing society; not united by class, race, or even by neighborhood. What was new wasn’t the “suburban revolt,” since that was already happening in the 80s, but the rupture with its established forms. The assailants weren’t listening to anybody at all anymore, not their big brothers, not the local associations assigned to help return things to normal. No “SOS Racism which **only fatigue, falsification, and media omertà** 4 **could feign putting an end**. The whole series of nocturnal strikes, **anonymous attacks, wordless destruction, had the merit of busting wide open the split between politics and the political**. No one can honestly deny the obvious weight of **this assault** which **made no demands**, and **had no message other than a threat which had nothing to do with politics**. But **you’d have to be blind not to see what is purely political about this resolute negation of politics,** and you’d certainly have to know absolutely nothing about the autonomous youth movements of the last 30 years. **Like abandoned children** **we burned the first baby toys of a society that deserves no** more **respect** than the monuments of Paris did at the end of Bloody Week 5 -- and knows it. **There’s no social solution to the present situation**. **First** off **because the vague aggregate of social groupings, institutions, and individual bubbles that we designate by the anti-phrase “society” has no substance**, **because there’s no language left to express common experiences wit**h. It took a half-century of fighting by the Lumières to thaw out the possibility of a French Revolution, and a century of fighting by work to give birth to the fearful “Welfare State.” Struggles creating the language in which the new order expresses itself. Nothing like today. Europe is now a de-monied continent that sneaks off to make a run to the Lidl 6 and has to fly with the low-cost airlines to be able to keep on flying. **None of the “problems” formulated in the social language are resolvable**. The “retirement **pensions** issue,” the issues of “precariousness,” the “**youth**” and their “**violence**” can only be kept in suspense as long as the ever more surprising “acting out” they thinly cover gets managed away police-like. No one’s going to be happy to see old people being wiped out at a knockdown price, abandoned by their own and with nothing to say. And **those who’ve found less humiliation and more benefit in a life of crime than in sweeping floors will not give up their weapons, and prison won’t make them love society.** The rage to enjoy of the hordes of the retired will not take the somber cuts to their monthly income on an empty stomach, and will get only too excited about the refusal to work among a large sector of the youth. And to conclude, **no guaranteed income granted the day after a quasi-uprising will lay the foundations for a new New Deal,** a new pact, and a new peace. The **social sentiment is** rather **too evaporated** **for all that.** As their solution, **they’ll just never stop putting on the pressure, to make sure nothing happens, and with it we’ll have more and more police chases all over the neighborhood**. **The drone that** even according to the **police** indeed did **fly** over Seine-Saint-Denis 7 last July 14 th **is a picture of the future in much more straightforward colors than all the hazy images we get from the humanists.** That they took the time to clarify that it was not armed shows pretty clearly the kind of road we’re headed down. The country is going to be cut up into ever more air-tight zones. Highways built along the border of the “sensitive neighborhoods” already form walls that are invisible and yet able to cut them off from the private subdivisions. Whatever good patriotic souls may think about it, the management of neighborhoods “by community” is most effective just by its notoriety. **The purely metropolitan portions of the country, the main downtowns, lead their luxurious lives in an ever more calculating, ever more sophisticated, ever more shimmering deconstruction.** They light up the whole planet with their whorehouse red lights, while the BAC 8 and the **private security companies’** -- read: militias’ -- **patrols multiply** infinitely, **all the while benefiting from being able to hide behind an ever more disrespectful judicial front. The catch-22 of the present**, though perceptible everywhere, **is denied everywhere**. **Never have so many** psychologists, sociologists, and literary **people devoted themselves to it, each with their own special jargon, and each with their own specially missing solution**. It’s enough just to listen to the songs that come out these days, the trifling “new French music,” where the petty-bourgeoisie dissects the states of its soul and the K’1Fry mafia 9 makes its declarations of war, to know that this coexistence will come to an end soon and that a decision is about to be made. This book is signed in the name of an imaginary collective. Its editors are not its authors. They are merely content to do a little clean-up of what’s scattered around the era’s common areas, around the murmurings at bar-tables, behind closed bedroom doors. They’ve only determined **a few necessary truths**, whose universal repression **fill**s **up** **the psychiatric hospitals and the painful gazes**. They’ve made themselves scribes of the situation. It’s the privilege of radical circumstances that **justice leads** them **quite logically to revolution**. It’s enough just to say what we can see and not avoid the conclusions to be drawn from it.

#### The Visibility Link —

#### By exposing their strategy and tipping their hand in favor of a strategy oriented with regards to the political the aff has destined itself for failure – to be subjugated by the media, the state, whiteness – the very method of the 1AC has been consumed and co-opted via its very articulation

The alternative is a re-articulation of what it means to be political – resistance lives in the underground – the invisible and the imperceptible – change is not affected until we do not even realize it – we do not vie for change in the public realm – but rather in the private – exercising individual agency without the aide or restrictions of a coalition or recognition

#### **The Borders Link —**

#### **Paradoxically the notion of borders reifies transnational sovereignty – borders are nothing but a mode of political control to organize space and movement – the aff plays into the hands of the police**

Stephenson et al 8, Dimitris Papadopoulos, PhD in Social Sciences from the Free University of Berlin, Niamh Stephenson, Senior Lecturer in Social Science the School of Public Health and Community Medicine, Vassils Tsianos, PhD Sociology Department of Social Sciences from the University of Hamburg, 2008, (“Escape Routes Control and Subversion in the Twenty-first Century”, <http://www.elimeyerhoff.com/books/Escape_routes.pdf>, AW)

We use this image as the paradigmatic figure for the emergence of a new mode of political power, postliberal sovereignty, which breeds in the core of the dominant transnational sovereignty. Postliberal sovereignty is neither a substitute, nor an alternative, nor the next stage of transnational sovereignty. Transnationalism is an integral component of postliberal sovereignty. The concept of postliberal sovereignty allows us to recognise the formation of emerging hegemonic projects which make up the space of transnationalism in the beginning of the twenty-first century (Greven and Pauly, 2000). The commonality between transnationalism and postliberal sovereignty is that both deal with the aporias of constitutionalism, that is, they both attempt to solve, on a global level, the national crisis of the double-R axiom. The difference between them is that transnationalism is inherently apolitical; it pretends to solve the problem on a simply horizontal level, while postliberal sovereignty inserts hegemonic political claims into the global horizontal space.

Transnational sovereignty presents a solution for the problem of rights and representation by adding dynamism to the borders of national sovereignty. Historically borders were lines of demarcation between national sovereignties. Transnationalism implodes these demarcation lines and reinterpellates, on a global scale, the participating actors of national sovereignty in many different ways (Brenner, 2004). Transnational sovereignty merges national spaces and their actors with other international players into a unified horizontal plane by asserting arbitrariness in the way borders are established (Castells, 1997). Borders are no longer by definition the limits between national sovereignties; rather – as discussed in Section IV – they are erected wherever there is a need to solve and to organise social space and political governance (Larner and Walters, 2004; Rigo, 2005). Consider, for example, the emergence of the new virtual European borders in North Africa – borders erected to control the flow of migration into Europe by maintaining aspiring migrants in externalised camps or internal borders erected in the heart of metropolises of Global North Atlantic countries. Making and remaking borders in a contingent way was the strategy transnational- ism deployed to solve the crisis of the double-R axiom.

#### The permutation scripts the resistance that the alternative can engage in by defining them as per the 1ac—refuse this framing as one that eviscerates agency – it links to all our offense

Peggy Phelan 96, chair of New York University's Department of Performance Studies, Unmarked: the politics of performance, 26-7

Representation is almost always on the side of the one who looks and almost never on the side of the one who is seen. As feminist film theorists have demonstrated, the fetishized image of the female star serves as a deeply revealing screen for the construction of men’s desire. The image of the woman displays not the subjectivity of the woman who is seen, but rather the constituent forces of desire of the man who wants to see her. 38 Visibility and invisibility are crucially bound; invisibility polices visibility and in this specific sense functions as the ascendant term in the binary. Gaining visibility for the politically under-represented without scrutinizing the power of who is required to display what to whom is an impoverished political agenda. Within the psychic and aesthetic economy of the Western gaze, the visible image of the other necessarily becomes a cipher for the looking self. To overturn these economies the failure of the inward gaze to produce self-seeing needs to be acknowledged. If one could confront the internal/external other as always already lost one would not have to rely so heavily on the image of the external other to produce what the looker lacks. This suggestion is not a refusal of multicultural diversity or of a more inclusive representational landscape. It is rather a way to isolate the impotency of the inward gaze as a fundamental aspect of representational economies